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Executive Summary 
Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA) launched an extended attack on the United States by using 
computational propaganda to misinform and polarize US voters. This report provides the first major 
analysis of this attack based on data provided by social media firms to the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (SSCI). 
 
This analysis answers several key questions about the activities of the known IRA accounts. In this 
analysis, we investigate how the IRA exploited the tools and platforms of Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, 
and YouTube to impact US users. We identify which aspects of the IRA’s campaign strategy got the 
most traction on social media and the means of microtargeting US voters with particular messages. 
 
• Between 2013 and 2018, the IRA’s Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter campaigns reached 
tens of millions of users in the United States. 
o Over 30 million users, between 2015 and 2017, shared the IRA’s Facebook and 
Instagram posts with their friends and family, liking, reacting to, and commenting on 
them along the way. 
o Peaks in advertising and organic activity often correspond to important dates in the US 
political calendar, crises, and international events. 
o IRA activities focused on the US began on Twitter in 2013 but quickly evolved into a 
multi-platform strategy involving Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube amongst other 
platforms. 
o The most far reaching IRA activity is in organic posting, not advertisements. 
 
• Russia's IRA activities were designed to polarize the US public and interfere in elections by: 
o campaigning for African American voters to boycott elections or follow the wrong voting 
procedures in 2016, and more recently for Mexican American and Hispanic voters to 
distrust US institutions; 
o encouraging extreme right-wing voters to be more confrontational; and 
o spreading sensationalist, conspiratorial, and other forms of junk political news and 
misinformation to voters across the political spectrum. 
 
• Surprisingly, these campaigns did not stop once Russia's IRA was caught interfering in the 
2016 election. Engagement rates increased and covered a widening range of public policy 
issues, national security issues, and issues pertinent to younger voters.  
o The highest peak of IRA ad volume on Facebook is in April 2017—the month of the 
Syrian missile strike, the use of the Mother of All Bombs on ISIS tunnels in eastern 
Afghanistan, and the release of the tax reform plan. 
o IRA posts on Instagram and Facebook increased substantially after the election, with 
Instagram seeing the greatest increase in IRA activity. 
o The IRA accounts actively engaged with disinformation and practices common to 
Russian “trolling”. Some posts referred to Russian troll factories that flooded online 
conversations with posts, others denied being Russian trolls, and some even complained 
about the platforms’ alleged political biases when they faced account suspension. 
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Introduction: Rising IRA Involvement in US Politics 
Most of what we know of Russia's social media campaigns against voters in democracies comes from 
the small amounts of data released by the major social media firms. There is certainly a constant flow of 
examples of suspected Russian-backed, highly automated or fake social media accounts working to 
polarize public understanding of important social issues. But understanding the structure and reach of 
the Internet Research Agency’s efforts requires large pools of data. In the summer of 2017, the major 
social media firms provided a snapshot of such data pertaining to campaigns against voters in the United 
States. 
 
Russia's Internet Research Agency (IRA) began targeting US voters for misinformation as early as 2012, 
using some of the techniques it had deployed on its own citizens and those of neighboring countries in 
Eastern Europe. The Twitter dataset contains posts in a variety of languages. Some of the accounts were 
also “re-purposed” in their targeting. For example, some were shifted from operating in Indonesian for 
an Indonesian audience to operating in English for a US audience (see Appendices for additional data). 
While the IRA targeted a few different countries and language communities, the vast majority of its 
output was written in Russian and English. 
 
The IRA’s activities across the major social media platforms have grown in recent years. Figure 1 plots 
the average monthly volume of live ads purchased by the IRA per year, from 2015 to 2017. Figure 1 and 
Table 1 show that the volume of live Facebook ads purchased in the US by the IRA increased between 
2015 and 2017. In 2016, the average monthly volume of live ads was more than double the 2015 level 
and remained similar in 2017. Unlike the ads, the monthly volume of organic Facebook posts rose 
steadily between 2015 and 2017. Between 2015 and 2016, monthly organic post volume increased 
almost sevenfold and continued to rise rapidly into 2017. On Instagram, after a small increase in average 
monthly post volume between 2015 and 2016, we see a large increase between 2016 and 2017. Unlike 
the average volume of Facebooks ads, the average volume of Facebook and Instagram organic posts was 
much higher in 2017 than in 2016: by a factor of 1.7 for Facebook organic posts, and by a factor of 2.3 
for Instagram organic posts. The volume of Twitter posts (tweets) did not change significantly in the 
period 2015-2017, as shown in Figure 1.a. 
 
In more detail, Table 1 shows the values for the average monthly volume of IRA Facebook ads, 
Facebook organic posts, Instagram organic posts, and Twitter posts (tweets). We note that Twitter 
provided data for many more accounts (3,841 accounts) than Facebook and Instagram (76 Facebook ad 
accounts; 81 Facebook pages; and 133 Instagram accounts). Google chose not to disclose any account 
data on ads, YouTube, or Google+ so Google is not included in Figure 1 or Table 1. 
   
The volume of Twitter posts made available to us is much larger than the volume of Facebook ads, 
Facebook posts, and Instagram posts. The average monthly Twitter post volume is over fifty thousand 
tweets per month, while the average monthly volume of Facebook ads, Facebook posts, and Instagram 
posts is in the hundreds to low thousands, never exceeding the six thousand mark. 
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Figure 1: The Volume of IRA Activity, Monthly Average (Twitter on Right Axis) 
 
 
 
Note:  Facebook, Instagram and YouTube relative to the primary left axis, Twitter relative to the secondary right 
axis. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: The Volume of IRA Facebook Ads, Facebook Posts, Instagram Posts, and Tweets, 
Monthly Average 
 
Year Facebook Ads Facebook Posts Instagram Posts Twitter Posts 
2015              207               360            2,110          59,126  
2016              564            2,442            2,611          57,247  
2017              541            4,234            5,956          59,634  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI. 
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Data & Methodology 
Major social media firms provided the SSCI with data on the accounts that these firms identified as 
being IRA-origin. Facebook provided data on ads bought by IRA users on Facebook and Instagram and 
on organic posts on both platforms generated by accounts the company knew were managed by IRA 
staff. Twitter provided a vast corpus of detailed account information on the Twitter accounts the 
company knew were managed by IRA staff. Google provided images of ads, videos that were uploaded 
to YouTube, and non-machine-readable PDFs of tabulated data on advertisements but provided no 
context or documentation about this content.  
 
The research teams at the University of Oxford and Graphika agreed to a Non-Disclosure Agreement 
with the SSCI for a short period of 7 months to prepare this report in a rigorous and secure manner. Our 
analysis is notable for two reasons. First, our analysis is the first, most comprehensive analysis of the 
data provided to the Senate by the social media firms. Second, the data enables an understanding of IRA 
activity across platforms, along with visibility into platforms on which little or no data had previously 
been revealed, such as Instagram. As a firm, Facebook manages both Facebook and Instagram 
platforms. While the company provides researchers with very restricted access to publicly valuable 
Facebook platform data through its Application Programming Interface (API), it currently provides none 
on Instagram.  
 
The data provided by Facebook, Twitter, and Google reveals new aspects of how the IRA’s activity on 
social media has afflicted US politics in the last few years. Facebook and Instagram data covers the 
period 2015-2017, Twitter data covers the period 2009-2018, and YouTube data spans the period 2014-
2018. This report presents the most comprehensive analysis of the raw data provided, and actually 
makes use of three sources: (1) public data, (2) the special data that technology platforms provided to the 
SSCI, and (3) the special data that was publicly released by the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence (HPSCI). 
 
Below we outline the broad contours of the multiple kinds of data analyzed in this report. 
 
• Facebook provided data on 3,393 individual ads. Public data released by the HPSCI provided details 
on 3,517 ads. These ads encouraged users to engage with specific pages. These pages were the 
center of issue-based ad campaigns run by the IRA.  
• Facebook provided data on 76 different ad accounts purchasing ads on behalf of these campaigns on 
Instagram and Facebook, though only a handful were responsible for the majority of ad spend.  
• On Facebook, these campaigns generated a total of 67,502 organic posts (produced by the IRA page 
administrator and not advertised) across 81 different pages. 
• On Instagram, these campaigns generated a total of 116,205 organic posts across 133 different 
Instagram accounts.  
• The campaigns’ organic Facebook posts had very high levels of engagement. In total, IRA posts 
were shared by users just under 31 million times, liked almost 39 million times, reacted to with 
emojis almost 5.4 million times, and engaged sufficient users to generate almost 3.5 million 
comments. Table 2 below provides further detail. 
• Engagement was not evenly distributed across the 81 pages for which Facebook provided organic 
post data: the top twenty most liked pages received 99% of all audience engagement, shares, and 
likes. Twenty ad campaigns received the most attention from audiences and absorbed the majority of 
the IRA’s spending.  
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• On Instagram, a similar pattern is evident. In total, all Instagram posts garnered almost 185 million 
likes and users commented about 4 million times. Forty pages received 99% of all likes. The themes 
of these Instagram posts do not seem to differ significantly from those of Facebook, though the 
presentation style is different.  
• The data Twitter provided contained handles and associated metadata for 3,841 accounts believed to 
have been managed by the IRA. The analysis of Twitter content in this report covers 8,489,989 posts 
(tweets, in this case) across 3,822 of these accounts.  
• Google provided images of 655 AdWords ads and 228 YouTube videos in mp4 (video) format 
without metadata, though they are named by their video ID. The images were not machine-readable 
and the data was incomplete and provided without context. 
 
Table 2 reveals the rapidly growing levels of attention received by IRA campaign communications on 
Facebook over time. In this report an “organic post” is a crafted message from an IRA-managed fake 
page or user account pretending to be a concerned citizen. Between 2015 and 2017, this IRA content 
generated increasing levels of interaction, in terms of sharing, liking, reactions, and comments. The data 
provided by Facebook does not allow us to say how much of this activity was from unique users. 
 
The most shared and liked forms of content are important because we have evidence that hundreds of 
thousands of people not only saw them, but also actively engaged with them. Sharing is particularly 
important as it exposes even more people to IRA content, including those who do not follow IRA pages. 
 
On Facebook, the five most shared and the five most liked posts focused on divisive issues, with pro-
gun ownership content, anti-immigration content pitting immigrants against veterans, content decrying 
police violence against African Americans, and content that was anti-Muslim, anti-refugee, anti-Obama, 
and pro-Trump. IRA posts tended to mimic conservative views against gun control and for increased 
regulation of immigrants. In some cases, terms such as “parasites” were used to reference immigrants 
and others expressed some tolerance of extremist views. The top five posts by known IRA accounts are 
overtly political and polarizing, and details about the content and engagement by social media users is 
described in Appendix B. On Twitter, of the five most-retweeted IRA accounts, four focused on 
targeting African Americans. 
 
 
 
Table 2: The Total Audience Engagement with Facebook Posts, by Year 
 
Year Shares Likes Emoji Reactions Comments 
2015 1,388,390 2,104,487 478 131,082 
2016 12,861,314 15,077,235 1,698,646 1,322,342 
2017 16,714,594 21,644,714 3,695,278 2,001,882 
Total 30,964,298 38,826,436 5,394,402 3,455,306 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI. 
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Overview of IRA Activity across Platforms 
The IRA adapted existing techniques from digital advertising to spread disinformation and propaganda 
by creating and managing advertising campaigns on multiple platforms, often making use of false 
personas or imitating activist groups. This strategy is not an invention for politics and foreign intrigue, it 
is consistent with techniques used in digital marketing. This overall strategy appeared to have served 
three advantages. First, it enabled the IRA to reach their target audiences across multiple platforms and 
formats. Indeed, the IRA's core messages and target audiences show consistency across the various 
platforms they used to reach the US population. Second, it helped create a semblance of legitimacy for 
the false organizations and personas managed by the IRA. We can hypothesize that users were more 
likely to assume the credibility of the false organizations set up by the IRA with a presence across 
multiple platforms, operating websites, YouTube channels, Facebook pages, Twitter accounts and even 
PayPal accounts set up to receive donations. Finally, the IRA was able to leverage their presence on 
multiple platforms once detection efforts caught up with them by redirecting traffic to platforms where 
their activities had not been disrupted, and by using their accounts on one social media platform to 
complain about suspensions of their accounts on another platform. 
 
The Broader Cross-Platform Picture 
The data examined in this section makes use of the following data sources: Twitter posts (tweets); 
organic posts on Facebook pages; Facebook ads; and organic posts on Instagram. The YouTube data 
provided to the SSCI was remarkably scarce and only included video files, without the context or 
metadata necessary to be comparable to the other datasets. We pursued an alternative approach to 
tracking IRA activity on YouTube, by extracting data on citations of YouTube content in IRA tweets to 
use as a proxy for the IRA’s exploitation of the YouTube platform. The proxy is imperfect, but the 
IRA’s heavy use of links to YouTube videos leaves little doubt of the IRA’s interest in leveraging 
Google’s video platform to target and manipulate US audiences.  
 
These combined sources provide a glimpse into the cross-platform strategy of the IRA, and reveal that 
other technology companies may have additional records on IRA activity. The provided dataset only 
includes data provided by Twitter, Facebook, and Google. Although it is reasonable to assume that the 
core of the IRA’s effort was conducted on these platforms, posts on these platforms provide links to 
others (notably Medium, PayPal, Reddit, Tumblr, and Pinterest). Many kinds of social media platforms 
have acknowledged that their internal investigations yielded IRA-related activity, but such activities are 
not evaluated here.  
 
Platforms that provided data to the SSCI have used different approaches and scopes when selecting the 
data to be shared. For instance, Twitter’s data contribution clearly covers activity in multiple languages, 
but Facebook’s data contribution focuses on activity only in English. Facebook chose not to disclose 
Profiles or Groups discovered throughout the course of their internal investigation and only shared 
organic post data from a small number of Pages with the Committee. As discussed earlier, Google’s data 
contribution was by far the most limited in context and least comprehensive of the three. Any cross-
platform analysis must take these different limits into account before drawing conclusions on differences 
in how these platforms may have been used by the IRA.  
 
Table 3 shows how much IRA activity (or engagement with IRA activity, in the case of Facebook ad 
clicks) increased in the six months after the 2016 election, across social media platforms.  
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Twitter as a Training Ground for Political Polarization Efforts 
The IRA began posting on Twitter in 2009 in Russian language and focused on a domestic Russian 
audience. The earliest accounts tweeting in English and targeting a US audience began operating in 
2013, but at a low level. English language tweet activity increased somewhat in early 2014, before 
ramping up dramatically at the end of 2014 into 2015 (Figure 2). 
 
Looking at timeline of activity across all platforms in Figure 2, it appears that the IRA initially targeted 
the US public using Twitter, which it had used domestically in Russia for several years. But as the IRA 
ramped up US operations toward the end of 2014, this dataset suggests that the IRA began leveraging 
other platforms in sequence: YouTube (here measured via Twitter citations of YouTube content), 
Instagram, and lastly Facebook. 
 
The latter part of Figure 2, from 2017 onwards, also highlights the different timing and stages of the 
platform’s own disruption efforts. As a result of internal investigations and subsequent takedowns, 
Facebook-related activity stops in abrupt stages, and the activity continues on Twitter before being 
similarly disrupted over nine months later. Google’s disruption efforts are impossible to audit and 
contrast with Facebook’s and Twitter’s efforts given the sparse data provided. 
 
Across Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, the data shows consistency in the different communities the 
IRA targeted and the topics of their organic posts and tweets, which consistently target audiences across 
the US political spectrum. In contrast, the YouTube videos provided by Google were predominantly 
used to target African Americans, although given Google’s limited provision of data, little can be said 
about the full scope of IRA activities involving its products. 
 
Vignette: A Campaign Across Platforms, the Case of Black Matters US  
One such campaign, Black Matters US, offers a window into how these platforms were leveraged for 
different strategic goals and used against one another once detection efforts disrupted the IRA’s 
campaign. Black Matters US maintained an online presence across multiple platforms: Twitter, 
Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Google+, Tumblr, and even PayPal, which it used to encourage 
donations to the group. These different accounts were used in concert to promote each other’s posts and 
events. The Black Matters Twitter account (@blackmattersus), for instance, persistently posted news 
stories from the associated website and promoted events organized through the Black Matters Facebook 
page. Through these links, readers could convert their online activity into offline rallies and protests.  
 
When the Black Matters Facebook page was shut down in August 2016, organizers started a new 
Facebook page a few days later simply called “BM”, which employed a new audience-building strategy 
around more positive themes of black affirmation and black beauty, seemingly to avoid further detection 
and suspension. This style of messaging was refined further through an associated @blackmattersus 
Instagram account.  
 
However, unlike the older Black Matters, the BM page was keen to redirect traffic to the associated 
website and its new “Meet Up” feature rather than to keep its audience engaged on the Facebook 
platform where its efforts had previously been detected and suspended. It is also after this initial 
suspension on Facebook that the IRA turned to Google Ads to promote the associated Black Matters US 
website, with ads leveraging text, image, and video formats. These ads sought to promote the Black 
Matters US website, including messages that provoke fear, ranging from statements such as “We are in 
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danger!” to ad text reading: “Cops kill black kids. Are you sure that your son won't be the next?” 
Following the initial suspension of the Black Matters Facebook page, the IRA also leveraged the Black 
Matters US Twitter account to complain about its suspension on the platform and to accuse Facebook of 
“supporting white supremacy.” More details on the case of Black Matters US are presented in Appendix 
F. 
 
Despite the IRA’s sophistication, their efforts to pose as US citizens on social media reveals mistakes 
that enable the detection. For instance, the use of Russian phone carriers and IP addresses for St. 
Petersburg are evident in the account metadata for user profiles the IRA had created. US technology 
firms’ differential responses also become apparent upon analyzing the data. We clearly observe a 
belated and uncoordinated response from the platforms that provided the data. In some cases, activity on 
one platform was detected and suspended months before similar action was taken against related activity 
on another platform. 
 
 
Table 3: Increase in IRA Activity in the Six-Month Period after the 2016 US Election 
 
Social Media Platform (Activity Metric) Increase in Activity (%) 
Instagram (Number of Posts) 238 
Facebook (Number of Posts) 59 
Twitter (Number of Tweets) 52 
YouTube (Number of Citations on Twitter) 84 
Facebook (Number of Ad Clicks) 45 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI. 
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Figure 2: The Cross-Platform IRA Activity, for All Platforms, Monthly Totals (Twitter on Right 
Axis) 
 
 
 
Note:  Facebook, Instagram and YouTube relative to the primary left axis, Twitter relative to the secondary right 
axis. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI 
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IRA Activity and Key Political Events in the US 
Having explored the cross-platform activity of the IRA, in this section we provide a detailed analysis of 
the evolution of IRA activity volume over time on Facebook and Instagram. 
 
We find that numerous events related to US politics between 2015 and 2017 are matched with 
significant increases in IRA activity. Several, but not all, spikes in ad and post volume happen on, or 
very soon after, the dates of important political events. Figures Figure 3-Figure 7 reveal the pacing of 
IRA account activity, with bursts of activity on a number of occasions: 
 
• the third Democratic primary debate and the sixth Republican primary debate (both in January 
2016); 
• the presidential candidate debates between Hilary Clinton and Donald Trump (autumn 2016); 
• election day (November 8, 2016); 
• the dates of the post-election Russian hacking investigation (December 29 and 30, 2016).  
 
Broadly, over the entire 2015-2017 period, the volume of activity in Facebook ads, Facebook posts, and 
Instagram posts increased from the Democratic and Republican National Conventions in July 2016 to 
voting day in November 2016.  
 
In these figures, ad volume is measured in terms of how many ads were live on a given day, for daily 
analyses, or month, for monthly analyses. Post volume is measured in terms of the number of posts 
uploaded on a given date or month. 
 
Figure 3 shows that ad volume increased steeply during the first part of the primaries (February to May 
2016), peaking in May, the month when candidates Ted Cruz and John Kasich suspended their 
campaigns and Trump crossed the delegate threshold for the GOP nomination. After this period, volume 
dipped temporarily but started increasing again in the month of the Democratic and Republican National 
Conventions and continued increasing until the month of the election, between July and November 
2016. Figure 3 shows a sharp drop in ad volume in the summer of 2017, a surprising pattern, which we 
speculate might be due to Facebook blocking the IRA from purchasing further ads, although this was not 
explicitly stated in the data provided by Facebook. Facebook announced in August and September of 
2017 that they were shutting down accounts by “threat actors” and IRA Facebook ads and pages (Shane 
& Goel, 2017; Shinal, 2017). Figure 3 also shows that the months with the most ad activity were long 
after the 2016 election (April and May 2017), and the third most active month being the month of the 
election itself, November 2016. 
 
In more detail, Figure 4 shows the volume of ads on a daily basis, allowing us to examine whether peaks 
in ad volume occurred around important political events. Important political events were compiled using 
news articles listing key political events during the 2016 US election cycle, based primarily on the 
following sources: ABC News, Reuters, the Guardian, Time magazine, CNN, and the New York Daily 
News (Stracqualursi, 2016; Allen, 2016; Gambino & Pankhania 2016; Teague Beckwith, 2018; CNN 
Library, 2018; Daily News Projects, 2018). 
 
Figure 4 reveals that the day with the highest ad volume was the day after the first presidential debate 
(September 26, 2016), and volume remained relatively high for several days after. Not all peaks directly 
followed an important political event such as a candidate debate. The second highest peak was on April 
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13, 2016, a day that did not feature significant news events directly related to ongoing campaigns. 
However, there were a few important events listed on this date by the New York Times, including a 
battery charge against Trump’s campaign manager, Corey Lewandowski. The third highest peak 
occurred three days after Ted Cruz suspended his campaign (May 3, 2016), and again activity remained 
relatively high for several days afterwards. The next five peaks happened post-election, in April 2017. 
There is also a peak on January 14, 2016, the day of the 6th Republican debate.  
 
However, it is likely that the organic posts on Facebook, not the ads, had the most reach. Figure 5 
indicates that up to June 2015 there are very few organic posts, often just a single post per day, even 
after the launch of the Clinton and Sanders campaigns in April 2015. Activity picks up in early June, 
before the Jeb Bush and Trump campaigns were launched in June 2015. It also shows that post volumes 
tended to rise over time, and from around October 2016 onwards organic post volumes picked up 
considerably. Volumes peaked in December 2016 and stayed high in early 2017 until they started 
dropping somewhat after May 2017. However, this drop is nowhere as dramatic as that exhibited by 
Facebook ads in the same period, in Figure 3. Monthly volumes in Figure 5 still remain around or above 
the 3,000 posts mark, far from dropping to zero, which is considerably higher than the average monthly 
volume for 2016 (around 2,400 units) and for 2015 (360 units), per Table 1. Indeed, volumes pick up 
again in August 2017. As discussed previously, we speculate that this modest drop might have been due 
to Facebook banning some of these accounts.  
 
Figure 6 shows how peaks in the daily volume of Facebook posts relate to important political events. We 
see some local spikes in Facebook posts after the final presidential debate between Clinton and Trump, 
and also on Election Day. However, the biggest spikes overall were on December 29 and 30, 2016 after 
the Obama administration announced that it was investigating Russian meddling in the US election and 
Putin stated that he would not respond with sanctions against the US. There is also a drop in activity on 
New Year’s Eve and New Year’s Day, though we did not see one over Christmas holidays. The volume 
of organic posts rose again on January 2, 2017.  
 
Finally, we examine the daily volume of organic posts on Instagram, shown in Figure 7. In terms of 
overall temporal trends in volume, Figure 7 shows that, on Instagram, post volumes showed four phases 
over time. First, post volumes pick up early, already from the first few months of 2015, in contrast to the 
Facebook posts which did not pick up until June 2015 (Figure 6), and increase until September 2015. In 
the next phase, there is a drop which also covers the primaries, in contrast to Facebook ads and posts, 
which showed some increases during the first part of the primaries. Next, there is a rise from the end of 
the primaries through the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, all through the elections 
and past them becoming steeper in 2017, and then reaching a peak in May 2017. In the final part, there 
is a drop from May 2017. The drop becomes particularly severe from August 2017, with a sharp two-
stage fall till the volume becomes negligible in October 2017. We speculate that this sharp drop might 
be due to Instagram detecting and deleting these accounts. This drop is similar to the steep drop seen in 
summer 2017 for Facebook ads (Figure 3), and somewhat in contrast to the summer trends for Facebook 
posts (Figure 6) where, even though post volume dropped somewhat, it still remained above the 5,000 
units mark (far from negligible), and picked up again in August 2017 (as shown in Appendix A).  
 
Figure 6 reveals that there were large spikes of activity related to key public moments in Clinton’s 
campaigning:  on June 30 2015, the day of the first release of Clinton’s emails; on September 4 2015, 
during the Clinton Benghazi investigation; on October 5 2015, the day after Clinton’s appearance on 
Saturday Night Live. The highest peaks overall are concentrated in 2017, however, showing again that, 
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on Instagram, IRA activities did not cease after the 2016 election but became substantially more 
vigorous. Indeed, the 95 days with the highest volume overall are in 2017, and 197 of the 200 highest 
peaks are in 2017. In addition to the pre-election peaks discussed above, others include two relatively 
high spikes after the 6th Republican debate and before the Iowa caucuses (January 15 and 19, 2016). 
Appendix A contains additional time plots of IRA activity. 
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Figure 3: The Volume of Facebook Ads, Monthly Totals 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The Volume of Facebook Ads, Daily Totals 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI. 
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Figure 5: The Volume of Facebook Posts, Monthly Totals 
 
 
Figure 6: The Volume of Facebook Posts, Daily Totals 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The Volume of Instagram Posts, Daily Totals 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI. 
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The IRA’s Advertising Campaign against US Voters 
 
People, Groups, and Networks Targeted by the IRA 
Facebook allows businesses to advertise on its platform through its Ads Manager software. The tool 
provides advertisers with the capacity to easily target users based on their interests and behaviors. 
“Interests” in this context refers to categories of content, such as “Veterans”, “Mexico” or “Malcolm X”, 
which Facebook’s Ads Manager can use to target audiences. The interests targeted the most by the ads 
are visualized in Figure 8. Our analysis of the interests shows that the IRA sought to segment Facebook 
and Instagram users based on race, ethnicity, and identity. Once this segmentation was completed, the 
IRA then ran multiple ad campaigns targeting different groups between 2015 and 2017. These 
campaigns were connected to Facebook pages controlled by the IRA, where they posted related organic 
content. 
 
Our analysis here focuses on ads purchased on Facebook and Instagram. The IRA also purchased ads on 
Google. The data shared by Google with the SSCI suggests the IRA’s ads sought to redirect traffic 
towards 38 different websites and URLs, leveraging a mix of text, display, and video formats. Without 
additional context, these 38 different links do not tell a clear story, and point to disparate efforts: 5 of 
these URLs point to YouTube videos, while another points to a website hosting information about 
voting in the Kenyan election targeted at Kenyan audiences, while another targeted residents of Johns 
Creek in Georgia (with a budget of $666), and others targeted Canadians with ads encouraging 
donations to Justin Trudeau’s campaign. The lack of context, metadata, and documentation prevents any 
further analysis of advertising products offered by Google that were purchased by the IRA. 
 
Data on 3,517 ads on Facebook and Instagram released by the HPSCI were analyzed. The data presented 
here is based on a sample of 3,233 ads (91.9% completion). Of these, 248 ads were not analyzed as a 
result of text extraction errors due to the format in which the data were released (PDF). All findings in 
this section are based on this sample.  
 
We used the ForceAtlas 2 layout algorithm (Jacomy et al., 2014) to produce the network graph of 
interests in Figure 8. ForceAtlas 2 lays out the graph such that densely connected nodes (in this case 
“interests”) appear more closely together. We can already see specific clusters of interests that the IRA 
had targeted: for example, the dense connections between “Mexico”, “Chicano rap” and “Hispanidad” 
interests suggest the IRA was intending to target Latin American Facebook and Instagram users. 
 
In order to confirm that these were valid clusters of interests, we used a standard technique for the 
detection of communities in network analysis (modularity, per Blondel et al., 2008). Using this 
automated method, we detected a series of clusters of related ads that clearly targeted a specific segment 
of Facebook and Instagram users. This was then validated through manual analysis of all of the interests, 
resulting in a final set of 20 segments that we describe in detail in Table 4. Note that Table 4 is not based 
on all of the ads studied (3,233 ads); it includes only those which targeted a single segment (2,855 ads). 
The 378 ads that targeted multiple interest groups are analyzed in more detail in Appendix C. 
 
We can see from Table 4 that the African American segment was targeted with the most ads. White 
users were divided into liberal and conservative segments and targeted differently. A number of other 
ethnic segments, including Latin Americans and Muslim Americans, were targeted with smaller 
campaigns. By selecting interests in Facebook’s Ads Manager tool, large audiences (for example 
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African Americans, and conservative voters) can be divided into smaller segments: for example, 
allowing the IRA to target African Americans across mainstream political and cultural issues, but also 
users with interests in Black Nationalism and identity, or with more specific interests in the prison 
system (“Incarceration” segment). Conservatives voters were targeted based on their interests in 
supporting veterans and police forces, particularly against Black Lives Matters, patriotism, the Second 
Amendment, and immigration. Finally, ads targeting Internet culture—for example those with interests 
in memes, comedy, funny pictures and music streaming—were geared towards attracting younger users. 
We also saw some ads that targeted no interests, often involving paid promotion of Facebook posts to 
those who had not already liked the page, intended to increase visibility with new audiences.  
 
Facebook uses an auction system to price impressions for different segments, meaning different target 
interests are priced differently, according to advertiser demand. We see from Table 4 that ads to African 
Americans, Native Americans, Latin Americans, and youth were the cheapest, while ads to 
conservatives, Muslim Americans, and LGBT users were the most expensive. If we look at the amount 
spent in total, we see that a similar amount was spent on conservatives (a small number of expensive 
ads) as was spent on targeting African Americans (a large number of cheap ads).  
 
 
Polarizing Ad Content Sent by the IRA on Facebook and Instagram 
We can see from our analysis of the dataset that IRA Facebook and Instagram ads and organic posts 
were targeted at specific groups. The IRA messaging had two strategies.  The first involved appealing to 
the narratives common within a specific group, such as supporting veterans and police, or pride in race 
and heritage, as a clickbait strategy to drive traffic to the Facebook and Instagram pages the IRA set up. 
Based on an analysis of both ads and posts, we find that the IRA posted content on these pages to which 
they drove traffic with ads. Then the pages posted content that intended to elicit outrage from these 
groups. However, the main difference is between conservative voters and all other identity groups in the 
audience segments summarized below is that where conservative voters were actively encouraged to get 
behind Trump’s campaign.  Other voters were encouraged to boycott the election, abstain from voting 
for Clinton, or to spread cynicism about participating in the election in general. 
 
We briefly outline below the strategies used against the main groups targeted on Facebook: African 
Americans; conservative voters; LGBT and liberal voters; Mexican American voters; and Muslim 
American voters. 
 
African American voters. Messaging to African Americans sought to divert their political energy away 
from established political institutions by preying on anger with structural inequalities faced by African 
Americans, including police violence, poverty, and disproportionate levels of incarceration. These 
campaigns pushed a message that the best way to advance the cause of the African American 
community was to boycott the election and focus on other issues instead. This often happened through 
the use of repetitive slogans. This accounts for the majority of content in the dataset that targeted this 
group.  
 
Conservative voters. Messaging to conservative voters sought to do three things: repeat patriotic and 
anti-immigrant slogans; elicit outrage with posts about liberal appeasement of “others” at the expense of 
US citizens; and encourage them to vote for Trump. Messaging to this segment of voters focused on 
divisive, and at times prejudiced and bigoted, statements about minorities, particularly Muslims. Well 
documented anti-Muslim tropes are present in both the ads and organic posts (for example claims about 
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the burqa, blanket statements about Muslims as terrorists and sexual deviants). Messaging also focused 
on pro-gun supporters and various strains of patriotic nationalism, in the form of Texan and Southern 
identity. Veterans & policing were important subjects of IRA messaging, often in the context of 
allegations of poor treatment of veterans by the Obama administration, in comparison to how well 
refugees were allegedly treated. Often, the IRA used unsourced numbers to persuade their audiences of 
this.  
 
LGBT and liberal voters. Messaging to these groups utilized the same types of symbolic politics of 
slogans encountered with African Americans. Here, ongoing current events seemed to play an important 
role and were framed with antagonism towards groups that are perceived as anti-gay (for example 
certain religious groups, certain segments of conservative voters). While there was a limited amount of 
discussion that sought to drive some of these voters towards Bernie Sanders or third parties, patterns of 
trying to reduce trust in the political system were more apparent. Claims meant to demerit Hillary 
Clinton are occasionally peppered into this content, but are relatively infrequent. We interpret messaging 
to this group as an attempt to increase polarization between liberals and conservatives around LGBT 
rights, a well-known wedge issue between these groups. 
 
Mexican American voters. Messaging to this group was limited until after the 2016 election, when the 
Brown Power campaign, run by the IRA, began to gain momentum. There is the repetition of the same 
themes as with African American voters, again geared towards increasing distrust and cynicism about 
the US political system. Coverage of issues such as deportation and treatment of migrants, as well as 
discrimination against them, were important themes. However, as is the case with African American 
voters, the majority of content tends to focus on slogans about identity that might resonate with this 
group.  
 
Muslim American voters. Messaging to this group was somewhat different than that of other identity 
groups. The main IRA page that targeted this community tended to promote positive narratives about 
Islam and Muslims (for example the values of the religion and its members, its history, and 
denouncements of terrorist attacks, as well as best wishes sent to victims of attacks in the US and 
abroad). While this does mirror some of the common discourse of Muslim Americans, it does not use 
the same kind of slogans that might resonate with Muslim Americans as was done with African 
Americans or Mexican Americans. It does, however, repeat the themes of suspicion towards the US 
government, particularly by drawing on US foreign policy. Some anti-Clinton content is peppered in, as 
it was with LGBT and liberal voters, but there are also a few pro-Clinton messages in the organic posts. 
 
Differential messaging to each of these target groups was designed to push and pull them in different 
ways. What is clear is that all of the messaging clearly sought to benefit the Republican Party—and 
specifically, Donald Trump. Trump is mentioned most in campaigns targeting conservative voters, 
where the messaging encouraged these groups to support his campaign. The main groups that could 
challenge Trump were then provided messaging that sought to confuse, distract, and ultimately 
discourage members from voting. While the IRA strategy was a long-term one, it is clear that activity 
between 2015 and 2016 was designed to benefit President Trump’s campaign. 
 
States Targeted by IRA Ads 
As well as allowing targeting of ads by interest, the Facebook Ad Manager allows targeting of ads by 
location of the target user, including city, state, and country. We found from the data that location 
targeting of ads was not used extensively by the IRA, with only 1,673 different instances of location 
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targeting, by 760 ads. These ads were usually used to target African Americans in key metropolitan 
areas with well-established black communities and flashpoints in the Black Lives Matter movement.  
Some make reference, for example, to Ferguson, MO, and a smaller group of ads marketed rallies and 
demonstrations to users living in particular places.  
 
Figure 9 below provides a count of the number of times a location was targeted per state. Swing states 
were targeted 543 times in total (out of 1,673 instances of location targeting). Swing states were defined 
based on the FiveThirtyEight classification. These included Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin (defined 
as “Traditional swing states”), and Arizona, Georgia, Maine, and Utah (defined as “New swing states”). 
See Silver, 2016. As well, there were 342 instances evident in the data in which areas with significant 
African American populations were targeted. We believe the targeting had more to do with race than a 
state’s role in the Electoral College or status as a swing state.  For example, African Americans in 
Ferguson, MO were targeted for the “Black Matters” campaign.  African Americans in Baltimore, MD 
and Oakland, CA were targeted for the “Blacktivist” campaign.  Texan cities were targeted for 
campaigns focusing on patriotism and pro-gun politics. However, more research is needed before we can 
say whether or not the IRA campaigns overall had an effect in those states. 
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Table 4: The Detected Audience Segments on Facebook, Total Spend, Impressions, and Clicks 
 
Audience Segment 
Number of 
Ads 
Purchased 
Total Spent on 
Ads Targeting 
Segment 
(RUB) 
Average Cost 
per Ad 
(RUB) 
User 
Impressions 
(per 
Segment) 
User Clicks 
(per 
Segment) 
African American Politics and Culture 841 761,745 905.76 13,594,144 1,417,209 
Black Identity and Nationalism 246 588,744 2,393.27 2,221,453 146,375 
Campus Politics 16 812 50.73 1,333 11 
Conservative Politics and Culture 166 1,025,843 6,179.78 2,878,401 254,007 
Immigration 60 81,611 1,360.18 162,939 26,980 
Incarceration 10 19,746 1,974.63 45,552 4,779 
Internet Culture 165 90,531 548.67 933,892 88,657 
Latin American Culture 143 120,328 841.45 4,680,521 548,139 
LGBT Rights & Social Liberalism 70 360,692 5,152.75 953,350 80,373 
Music Streaming 61 3,131 51.33 10,206 41 
Muslim American Politics and Culture 57 257,687 4,520.83 523,137 17,125 
Native American History and Culture 18 5,729 318.28 34,884 4,276 
None 753 888,121 1,179.44 4,005,747 346,070 
Other 4 2,262 565.41 12,860 97 
Patriotism 24 116,404 4,850.15 689,573 44,527 
Pro-gun Politics 66 156,557 2,372.08 832,874 65,596 
Self Defense 20 16,756 837.82 28,693 1,186 
Social Justice 81 297,403 3,671.64 1,264,902 71,126 
Texan Identity 11 39,480 3,589.12 60,965 4,386 
Veterans & Policing 43 78,099 1,816.25 743,693 15,986 
Total 2,855 4,911,680 1,720.38 33,679,119 3,136,946 
 
Note: Spend is given in Rubles (RUB), as supplied in the data. Impressions are the number of placements on a user’s 
screen, whether a web browser or mobile device. A click indicates that a user clicked on the link to the IRA-managed 
Facebook page associated with the ad. As an indication, the yearly average exchange rate of RUB to USD for 2016 was 
0.015 USD to 1 RUB (based on data from www.x-rates.com). The total ad spend of RUB 4,911,680 above corresponds 
to approximately USD 73,711.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data released by the HPSCI 
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Figure 9: The IRA Ad Targets, By State 
 
 
 
Note: This map shows state-level activity, and if an ad targeted users in multiple states, it was counted for each 
state. An ad targeting CA, TX, and MD is counted for each of those states. The numbers therefore show the 
number of times a particular state was targeted by an IRA ad on Facebook or Instagram, not the total number of 
ads that targeted that state.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data released by the HPSCI. 
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How the IRA Targeted US Audiences on Twitter 
In the dataset provided by Twitter, at least 57% of the IRA’s posts are in Russian, 36% are in English, 
and the remainder are in several languages. Our analysis confirms that the early focus of the IRA’s 
Twitter activity was the Russian public, targeted with messages in Russian from fake Russian users. 
These misinformation activities began in 2009 and continued until Twitter began closing IRA accounts 
in 2017. The IRA’s English-language, US-focused activity began in 2013. It increased dramatically at 
the end of 2014 to a level sustained through the 2016 election, after which it increased again. US-
focused activity decisively increased over the level of Russian-focused activity only in mid-2017, well 
after the US Presidential Election and shortly before Twitter suspended the majority of accounts in late 
2017 (Figure 10). 
 
The initial acceleration of the IRA’s US-focused Twitter campaigns at the end of 2014 began shortly 
after the IRA’s largest sustained Twitter campaign, which supported Russian activities in the Ukraine 
conflict from mid- to late 2014. This spike in Russian language activity was accompanied by an increase 
in English language tweets, which the IRA had produced in small amounts (hundreds per year) since 
2009, peaking at 148,177 in August 2014. Though in English, these tweets came primarily from 
“motivational” accounts, while others pushed the hashtag “#UkranianLie”. IRA activity that involved 
creating personas that mimicked segments of US audiences ramped up at the beginning of 2015, 
concurrent with a second major Russian language campaign to support the objectives of the Russian 
government in the Crimean and Donbass conflicts. Russian language IRA activity remained higher than 
English activity targeted at US audiences until 2016, when they became roughly equal. This acceleration 
is evident in Figures Figure 10 and Figure 11. 
 
Researchers have analyzed how the IRA played both sides of an issue, sometimes going so far as to 
organize opposing protests on either side of the same street, as the Facebook groups “Heart of Texas” 
and “United Muslims of America” did in Texas in May 2016. The IRA used the same approach on 
Twitter, constructing online “sock puppet” identities that mimicked a number of different types of 
legitimate users.  
 
This analysis reveals how sets of sock puppet accounts pretending to be members of particular 
ideological segments operated as coherent teams. An analysis of mentions relationships among these 
accounts reveals the primary configuration of embedded assets—sock puppets targeting specific 
communities—constructed by the IRA (Figure 12). Furthermore, analysis of IP addresses associated 
with the IRA accounts demonstrates that teams of accounts targeting both US liberals and conservatives 
were operated from the same IP address, proving the IRA used the tactic of playing both sides of the 
political spectrum against one another (see Appendices D, G, & H). 
 
IRA Teams in Twitter Mentions Network 
To better understand how the IRA’s Twitter accounts interacted with each other, we constructed a graph 
of mentions relationships among them (Figure 12). Of the 3,841 accounts in the IRA dataset, we found 
2,648 connected to at least one other IRA account. We used a force-directed layout algorithm 
(Fruchterman-Reingold) to position nodes based on mentions arcs, revealing the structure of these 
interactions. The resulting network (Figure 12) shows that sets of IRA accounts typically operated in 
“teams” of co-mentioners that corresponded closely to their fictitious online identities. Team members 
tended to mention teammates far more often than non-teammates, thus forming a number of coherent 
communities of interaction. 
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An analysis of accounts within the broader liberal and conservative groupings shows that the IRA 
focused their political messaging on two targets above others: conservative voters and African 
Americans. However, they created and maintained a wide variety of sock puppets. This included non-
political accounts, such as those focused on local news and marketing, and politically aligned accounts 
like conservative veterans and LGBT activists. 
 
Teams of accounts varied widely in their purpose, behavior, and level of activity. Some had a narrow 
objective and were mainly active over a short period of time. For instance, the non-partisan Food Hoax 
team primarily coordinated around Thanksgiving 2015 to spread a rumor of food poisoning from turkeys 
connected to Koch Farms and Walmart. Similarly, a partisan subset of conservative accounts 
(“Conservative 2”) existed primarily to push content from a junk news site, ReportSecret.com, in late 
2017 (per Figure 11). A “Local-focused” group primarily imitated non-partisan local news outlets and 
was heavily active throughout the IRA’s US timeline with an average output of 14,097 tweets per 
account, more than more than four times higher than the next most productive group, African American 
(a subset of the “Liberal” grouping), at 3,476 tweets per account. These variations demonstrate how the 
IRA operated teams of accounts pursuing different strategies, targeting different audiences, and 
employing different techniques of manipulation. 
 
Figure 10 and Figure 11 show the evolution of the number of IRA tweets over time. The IRA’s US-
focused Twitter activity featured false accounts posing as politically active US citizens on both sides of 
the liberal/conservative spectrum, and also accounts mimicking non-partisan local news sources. Per 
Figure 11, the local news accounts were particularly active throughout 2015, with activity (number of 
tweets) decreasing in 2016 until ramping up slightly just before the election, and increasing again after 
the election. While in early 2015, activity focused on conservatives was notably higher than activity 
focused on liberals, this gap closed later in the year. Conservative and liberal activity levels tracked 
closely together, at almost even levels, until early 2017. By the middle of 2017, there was a marked 
surge of activity focused on conservatives and decrease in activity focused on liberals. Most of the surge 
on the conservative side came from a new set of accounts (labeled “Conservative 2”), which focused 
their efforts on promoting content from a single junk news website, ReportSecret.com. 
 
News vs. Social Mobilization: Hashtag Usage by Political Lean of Target Audience 
 
The IRA’s tactics can be further understood by analyzing the content of their messages. A common 
content marker on Twitter is the hashtag, which indicates the topic of a particular tweet. We leverage 
prior work to examine the peakedness of hashtags (Etling et al., 2012). Peakedness measures how 
concentrated hashtag usage is in a time period. High peakedness refers to hashtags the usage of which is 
highly concentrated in time (high volumes of hashtag use over a narrow time period, and low use over 
the remainder of the time period under study), often corresponding (in this data) to operations around 
major real or fictitious events (such as #ColumbianChemical and #Fukushima2015). In contrast, 
hashtags with low peakedness are spread out more evenly over a longer period of time, and correspond 
with “Ongoing topics” (such as #News, #Sports, #Politics, #Local). Hashtags with low peakedness 
reference content in tweets that recurred over time, while hashtags with high peakedness were 
concentrated in specific bursts. The presence and high volume of hashtags in both categories is an 
important finding about the IRA’s strategy. The agency did not exclusively commit to spreading 
disinformation about breaking news. The agency did not commit to breaking fake news, such as the 
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#ColumbianChemical hoax about a chemical attack on a plant in Louisiana, or even to injecting 
disinformation into everyday conversation, but pursued both strategies. 
 
We further focus the peakedness analysis by political ideology. Figure 13 shows frequency by 
peakedness for hashtags used by IRA accounts presenting a conservative-leaning identity; Figure 14 
shows frequency by peakedness for hashtags used by IRA accounts presenting a US liberal-leaning 
identity (including African American). For example, Figure 13 shows that #Fukushima2015 was used 
more than 10,000 times in total, and 100% of uses of this hashtag occurred in the peak period of its use. 
In contrast, #MAGA was also used more than 10,000 times in total, but less than 10% of the uses of this 
hashtag occurred in the peak period of its use. 
 
Both figures have the same shape, but there is one key difference. When it comes to day-to-day 
hashtags, conservative-leaning IRA accounts talked about #news, #local, #world, and #TopNews; in 
contrast, liberal-leaning IRA accounts talked about #BlackLivesMatter, #BlackTwitter, and 
#PoliceBrutality. This suggests that IRA assets approached disinformation in ongoing topics differently 
based on the political affiliation of their target audience: US conservative audiences were targeted with 
tweets about general topics, such as the news, and African American audiences were targeted with 
tweets about more specific topics, such as the Black Lives Matter movement. This finding is consistent 
with the focus of IRA-sponsored ads on topics relevant to African Americans and those following the 
Black Lives Matter movement. More broadly, this finding suggests the IRA strategy on the conservative 
side included collecting a general conservative audience and pushing particular themes (#MAGA, #ISIS, 
#Trump), including mistrust of mainstream news and media (#WakeUpAmerica).  The strategy for race-
based appeal involved rallying African Americans around Black political identity and issues. 
 
In conclusion, the IRA Twitter data shows a long and successful campaign that resulted in false accounts 
being effectively woven into the fabric of online US political conversations right up until their 
suspension. These embedded assets each targeted specific audiences they sought to manipulate and 
radicalize, with some gaining meaningful influence in online communities after months of behavior 
designed to blend their activities with those of authentic and highly engaged US users. 
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Figure 10: The IRA Activity on Twitter Focused on Russia and the US,  
2009-2018, Monthly Totals 
  
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI 
 
 
Figure 11: The IRA Twitter Activity Focused on the US, by Category,  
2012-2018, Monthly Totals 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI 
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Figure 12: The Mentions Network of 2,648 IRA Accounts, 2009-2018 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI 
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Figure 13: The Frequency of Twitter Hashtags by Peakedness for IRA Activity Targeting US 
Conservatives 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI 
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Figure 14 : The Frequency of Twitter Hashtags by Peakedness for IRA Activity Targeting US 
Liberals 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI 
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Engaging US Voters with Organic Posts on Facebook and Instagram 
The IRA ran numerous campaigns that targeted different segments of US Facebook and Instagram users, 
which were set up by the IRA using 76 different Ads Manager accounts. Through interest and location 
targeting, each ad sought to attract users to its corresponding Facebook or Instagram page, with organic 
posts from IRA staff that contained slogans, stories, and commentaries on current events. These 
personalized messages exposed US users to a wide range of disinformation and junk news linked to on 
external websites, including content designed to elicit outrage and cynicism. By understanding the most 
active campaigns, it becomes clear that the IRA sought to energize conservatives around Trump’s 
campaign and encourage the cynicism of other voters in an attempt to neutralize their vote.  
 
While there were many campaigns, a handful resulted in significant user engagement: the vast majority 
of the organic posting activity was concentrated in 81 pages, which produced 67,502 organic posts 
between them. Almost all the engagement by users, that is, shares, likes, and comments, was received by 
only 20 pages, representing 99.6% of all engagement (Table 5). These 20 pages primarily targeted 
African American users and conservatives. In total, IRA content was shared by about 31 million users, 
liked by almost 39 million users, garnered almost 5.4 million emoji reactions, and generated almost 3.5 
million comments.  
 
Table 5 displays the top 20 IRA campaigns on Facebook, sorted by the number of likes they received 
from users on the platform. When compared with Table 2, it shows that the vast majority of likes, 
shares, emoji reactions, and comments were generated by users that engaged with content from these top 
20 campaigns.  
 
We focus on the top 10 organic post campaigns by likes and shares in the following analysis, which are: 
Being Patriotic, Stop A.I. (All Invaders), Heart of Texas, Blacktivist, United Muslims of America, Army 
of Jesus, Brown Power, LGBT United, South United, and BM (Black Matters). We explore when these 
campaigns were active over three timeframes: the primary season, late 2015 to mid-2016, around the 
2016 election with a focus on September and October 2016, and early to mid-2017. Breaking down the 
timeline allows exploration of relevant timeframes in which IRA activity can be differentiated. Viewing 
these top 10 campaigns over time makes evident that it was not until early 2016 that the IRA began 
running many simultaneous campaigns targeting different audience segments.  
 
Figure 15-Figure 17 visualize the activity of these campaigns and the user engagement they received 
from their audiences between 2015 and 2017. Figure 15 displays the proportion of all organic posts 
produced by each of these top 10 campaigns by month. For example, Being Patriotic and LGBT United 
account for almost 100% of the ads in June 2015, while in early 2017, almost all the campaigns are 
active. Figure 15 provides an overview of when these campaigns are most active relative to one another. 
Note that the total number of posts over this time period increased significantly. Therefore Figure 15 
only shows the relative activity as a proportion of all the top 10 campaigns, not absolute volumes of 
posts. Figure 16 and Figure 17 are stacked area plots that visualize the total number of likes and shares 
garnered by these top 10 campaigns between 2015 and 2017 by month. Unlike Figure 15, the numbers in 
these figures are absolute (not proportions). The likes and shares generated by each campaign are 
stacked upon one another to provide an impression of how much each campaign contributed to likes and 
shares in that month. 
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In mid-to-late 2015, “Being Patriotic” and “LGBT United” produced the majority of organic posts. By 
early 2016, seven of the ten campaigns were active and were posting regularly. In 2015, there were a 
total of 4,108 organic posts from a few of these campaigns. In total, more than half (2,139) targeted 
conservative users. “LGBT United” accounted for almost all of the rest (1,814 posts).  
 
In early 2016, just over half (3,799 of 7,451) of all organic posts were for campaigns targeting 
conservative  users (Being Patriotic, Heart of Texas, South United, and Stop All Invaders). This content 
prior to Trump’s securing the Republican nomination was not particularly oriented towards his 
campaign. In 2015, there are relatively few mentions of him on these campaigns targeting conservative 
voters. Rather, they stressed (and inflated) the harms of immigration, with a particular focus on Muslims 
and terrorism. Many ads focused on President Obama, accusing him of being a Muslim, building on 
ongoing biased reporting on Obama. While antagonism towards Muslims and President Obama were 
common in 2015, the majority of posts were positive stories about members of the armed services and 
patriotic slogans, often consistent with the content in the sponsored ads. Explicit mentions of Donald 
Trump increased in early and mid-2016, as his primary campaign gained momentum. These campaigns, 
however, seemed to be geared towards extending the anti-immigrant rhetoric that Trump’s campaign 
frequently made use of.  
 
United Muslims of America significantly increased its activity in this period, as did Blacktivist. For 
Blacktivist, United Muslims of America, and LGBT United, organic posts in the primary season were 
not particularly focused on any candidates—for example little mention is made of Bernie Sanders or 
Hillary Clinton. During this time, Blacktivist tended to post information on attacks on African 
Americans by police officers, Black Lives Matter, and messages about slavery and ongoing 
discrimination and mass incarceration affecting African Americans. United Muslims of America tended 
to provide a positive image of Islam and Muslims and often condemned terrorist attacks across the 
world. There is little evidence to suggest that during the primaries, these campaigns were focused on 
ongoing political campaigns by Clinton, Sanders, or Trump. Instead, the goal may have been to create a 
following for these pages, laying the foundation to later push content to audiences in 2016 and 2017. 
 
In the last six months of 2016, Figure 15-Figure 17 show a much more diverse set of campaigns 
emerging and posting organic content. In the last six months of 2016, there were a total of 9,373 organic 
posts produced by these ten campaigns (the “Army of Jesus” and “Brown Power” campaigns had just 
launched in late 2016). Of these posts, 4,596 (49%) were for conservative campaigns and 2,355 (25%) 
were for campaigns targeting African Americans. Until the election, 50% of the posts produced by these 
top 10 campaigns targeted conservative audiences. However, after the election, this proportion reduces 
to 45%. The analysis of the ads clearly suggests that African American audiences were targeted with the 
most ads. However, the majority of the activity of the IRA’s most successful campaigns, measured by 
likes and prior to the election, was actually focused on conservatives. While the black community is 
another important bloc, it is one among a handful of others. From the perspective of the campaigns, the 
primary focus appears to be on conservative audiences. Just prior to the election, attacks on Barack 
Obama and Hillary Clinton became more frequent among these campaigns, often offering opinions on 
data regarding their purported decrease of funding in services for US citizens while allegedly 
earmarking funds to support refugees. In September, October, and November, 1,597 posts targeted 
conservatives and other conservative voters. While there are temporary increases in daily posting 
following each presidential debate, these increases are neither particularly acute nor do they often 
mention anything that was discussed during the debates. 
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It is evident that the campaigns sought to demobilize African Americans, LGBT, and liberal voters. This 
was attempted through organic posts that attacked Hillary Clinton. Content referred to President 
Clinton’s 2016 signing into law of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) as an attack on the gay 
community, and in another, argued that Hillary supports Muslims, who the post insinuates are anti-gay. 
Attacks on Clinton and calls for voter disengagement were particularly clear in Blacktivist during 
September, October, and November 2016, with statements such as “NO LIVES MATTER TO 
HILLARY CLINTON. ONLY VOTES MATTER TO HILLARY CLINTON” (Blacktivist, 29 October 
2016), another one argues that black people should vote for Jill Stein (Blacktivist, 7 October 2016), or 
not vote at all, with the claim: “NOT VOTING is a way to exercise our rights” (Blacktivist, 3 November 
2016). 
 
After the election, campaigns targeting conservative voters continued to constitute the plurality of 
content. As Figure 15-Figure 17 show, “Brown Power,” which targeted Latin Americans, only began 
producing organic posts after the election. These broadly followed similar patterns to those of 
“Blacktivist” and “Black Matters”— repeating narratives of positivity towards Mexican Americans and 
posting commentaries on stories that affect this community. The “Army of Jesus” campaign also started 
in the same timeframe. These posts are rather different to others that targeted conservative users. Instead 
of negative messaging about immigrants and antagonism towards liberals, these messages involved a 
more conciliatory discourse centered on Christianity as a means to heal the divides that crystallized in 
the US by the end of 2016. These posts encouraged users to put less faith in politics and instead be 
faithful to God: “America is in trouble and the solution is not in the politics, not the Democratic Party or 
the Republican Party. The only hope for this nation is God…Like if you agree!” (Army of Jesus, 6 
November 2016). Other campaigns continued their general themes, and significant differences have not 
been observed, though qualitative observations about the differences between content after the election 
requires further exploration. 
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Table 5: The Top 20 IRA Facebook Pages, Sorted by Number of Likes 
 
Facebook Pages Managed by the 
IRA (Top 20 Liked) 
Number of 
Likes 
Number of 
Shares 
Number of 
Reactions 
Number of 
Comments 
Being Patriotic 6,431,507 4,429,880 399,542 393,179 
Stop A.I. (Stop All Immigrants) 6,050,989 5,202,716 552,684 778,924 
Heart of Texas 5,489,337 4,986,384 590,664 414,599 
Blacktivist 4,642,946 4,843,595 1,411,605 509,882 
United Muslims of America 2,479,294 1,268,022 265,716 175,976 
Army of Jesus 2,359,018 651,106 262,113 387,765 
Brown Power 2,098,769 1,300,998 373,643 128,795 
LGBT United 1,974,368 930,199 396,257 87,500 
South United 1,419,503 2,263,031 101,931 72,461 
BM (Black Matters) 1,333,173 1,797,479 325,864 146,254 
Secured Borders 1,220,079 713,905 121,553 117,824 
Defend the 2nd 986,969 551,847 90,228 39,530 
Williams&Kalvin 569,627 541,436 138,078 39,960 
Woke Blacks 454,151 490,623 127,179 37,876 
Back the Badge 410,364 155,524 63,765 26,274 
Veterans Come First 330,662 307,021 45,057 33,302 
Memopolis 135,704 78,996 21,061 13,002 
Pan-African roots MOVE 124,938 152,931 44,929 15,655 
Born Liberal 104,314 79,938 22,933 5,749 
Black Matters 59,032 97,516 14,620 9,350 
Total 38,674,744 30,843,147 5,369,422 3,433,857 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI. 
  
36 
 
 
Figure 15: The Proportional Volume of Facebook Organic Posts for Top 10 Campaigns 
 
 
Note: Values on the y-axis refer to the proportion of total organic posts produced by all of the campaigns over 
time. For example, in June 2015, LGBT United posted over 70% of all total posts in that month, while Being 
Patriotic posted the remainder. The chart only tells us what proportion of the posts came from a particular ad 
campaign, and does not tell us the total number of posts, which were much higher in 2016 and 2017 than 2015.  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI. 
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Figure 16: The Total Likes on Organic Posts for Top 10 Campaigns, in Millions 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI. 
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Figure 17: The Total Shares of Organic Posts for Top 10 Campaigns, in Millions 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by the SSCI. 
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Conclusion: IRA Activity and Political Polarization in the US 
The data on the Internet Research Agency (IRA) provided to the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (SSCI) by US social media and Internet platforms demonstrates a sustained effort to 
manipulate the US public and undermine democracy. With years of experience manipulating public 
opinion in Russia, the IRA used major social media platforms including Facebook, Instagram, and 
Twitter to target US voters and polarize US social media users.  
 
The Russian effort targeted many kinds of communities within the US, but particularly the most extreme 
conservatives and those with particular sensitivities to race and immigration. The IRA used a variety of 
fake accounts to infiltrate political discussion in liberal and conservative communities, including black 
activist communities, in order to exacerbate social divisions and influence the agenda. Accounts posing 
as liberal and as conservative US users were frequently created and operated from the same computers. 
 
“Cyber troops” are defined here as government or political party actors tasked with manipulating public 
opinion online (Bradshaw & Howard, 2018a). Specifically, we focus on how these actors disseminate 
computational propaganda over social media platforms. We define computational propaganda as the use 
of automation, algorithms, and big-data analytics to manipulate public life (Howard & Woolley, 2016). 
The term encompasses issues to do with so-called “fake news”, the spread of misinformation on social 
media platforms, illegal data harvesting and micro-profiling, the exploitation of social media platforms 
for foreign influence operations, the amplification of hate speech or harmful content through fake 
accounts or political bots, and clickbait content for optimized social media consumption. This report has 
examined how the IRA made use of computational propaganda to shape public opinion in the US.  
 
The affordances of social media platforms make them powerful infrastructures for spreading 
computational propaganda (Bradshaw & Howard, 2018b). Social media are particularly effective at 
directly reaching large numbers of people, while simultaneously microtargeting individuals with 
personalized messages. Indeed, this effective impression management—and fine-grained control over 
who receives which messages—is what makes social media platforms so attractive to advertisers, but 
also to political and foreign operatives. Where government control over Internet content has traditionally 
relied on blunt instruments to block or filter the free flow of information, powerful political actors are 
now turning to computational propaganda to shape public discourse and nudge public opinion.  
 
A strong democracy requires high-quality news from an independent media, a pluralistic climate of 
opinion, and the ability to negotiate public consensus. But the IRA leveraged social media to 
manufacture and spread junk news, manipulate public opinion, and subvert democratic processes.  
 
Social media platforms are among the most used applications on the Internet. In the US, 85% of the 
adult population uses the Internet regularly, and 80% of those people are on Facebook (Greenwood, 
Perrin, & Duggan, 2016). Most of the time, social media are not used for politics: they are a place where 
friends and families connect and reconnect, or where individuals find and share entertainment, popular 
culture, as well as humorous cat videos. The ubiquity and prominence of social media for everyday life 
underscores their importance in today’s society, and users place high amounts of trust in these platforms. 
But with their ability to segment audiences and target messages in a quick, cheap and largely 
unregulated way, it is clear why these platforms have attracted the interest of political operators. 
Unfortunately, there is mounting evidence that social media are being used to manipulate and deceive 
the voting public—and to undermine democracies and degrade public life. 
40 
 
 
We once celebrated the fact that social media let us express ourselves, share content, and personalize our 
media consumption. It is certainly difficult to tell the story of the Arab Spring without acknowledging 
that social media platforms allowed democracy advocates to coordinate themselves in surprising new 
ways: to send their demands for political change cascading across North Africa and the Middle East 
(Howard & Hussain, 2013). But the absence of human editors in our news feeds also makes it easy for 
political actors to manipulate social networks. In previous research conducted by the Computational 
Propaganda Project, we found rather paradoxical evidence of the chilling effect of social media on 
freedom of speech and political participation. Half of Russian Twitter conversations involve highly 
automated accounts that actively shape online discourses (Sanovich, 2018). In Brazil, both professional 
trolls and bots have been used aggressively to drown out minority and dissenting opinions during three 
presidential campaigns, one presidential impeachment campaign, and the major race for the Mayor of 
Rio (Arnaudo, 2018). Social media have gone from being the natural infrastructure for sharing collective 
grievances and coordinating civic engagement, to being a computational tool for social control, 
manipulated by canny political consultants, and available to politicians in democracies and dictatorships 
alike (Howard & Woolley, 2016).  
 
However, understanding precisely how social media platforms impact public life is difficult (Bradshaw 
& Howard, 2018a). In many democracies it is not even clear that spreading computational propaganda 
contravenes election laws (Howard, Woolley, & Calo, 2018). It is, however, quite clear that the 
strategies and techniques used by government cyber troops have an impact, and that their activities 
violate the norms of democratic practice. We cannot prevent all bad actors from using computational 
propaganda, but in democracies we can have guidelines discouraging its use. To start to address these 
challenges, we need to develop stronger rules and norms for the use of social media, big data and new 
information technologies during elections. 
 
During 2016 and 2017 we saw significant efforts made by Russia to disrupt elections around the world, 
but also political parties in these countries spreading disinformation domestically. Looking at the growth 
of cyber troop activity from 2017 to 2018 has demonstrated that these strategies are circulating globally. 
We cannot wait for national courts to address the technicalities of infractions after running an election or 
referendum. Protecting our democracies now means setting the rules of fair play before voting day, not 
after.  
 
This analysis has several consequences for public policy and industry behavior. Obviously, democracies 
need to take computational propaganda seriously as a threat to their public life. Social media firms need 
to share valuable data about public life with the public. For example, Facebook now focuses on ad 
transparency, while disabling the API for public posts and not offering an Instagram API at all. 
However, in this report we found that the IRA’s political ad activity has not particularly increased over 
time, while organic post activity has. Organic post activity is also much greater in volume than political 
ad activity. As well, our findings indicate that organic posts receive far more engagement. The loss of 
access to the API for public post data prevents further public understanding of the latest trends in 
computational propaganda. 
 
Finally, this process of investigating IRA activities has also allowed us—as researchers—to develop 
some recommended best practices for social media firms that want to hold the public trust. First, all 
social media platforms should provide an open and consistent API that allows researchers to analyze 
important trends in public life. For example, Twitter used to provide researchers at major universities 
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with access to several APIs, but has withdrawn this and provides so little information on the sampling of 
existing APIs that researchers increasingly question its utility for even basic social science. Facebook 
provides an extremely limited API for the analysis of public pages, but no API for Instagram. Facebook 
provided the US Senate with information on the organic post data of 81 Facebook pages, and the data on 
Facebook ads bought by 76 accounts. Twitter’s data contribution covered activity in multiple languages, 
but Facebook’s data contribution focuses on activity only in English. Facebook chose not to disclose 
data from IRA Profiles or Groups and only shared organic post data from a small number of Pages with 
the Committee. Google chose to supply the Senate committee with data in a non-machine-readable 
format. The evidence that the IRA had bought ads on Google was provided as images of ad text and in 
PDF format whose pages displayed copies of information previously organized in spreadsheets. This 
means that Google could have provided the useable ad text and spreadsheets—in a standard machine-
readable file format, such as CSV or JSON, that would be useful to data scientists—but chose to turn 
them into images and PDFs as if the material would all be printed out on paper.  
 
Even in times of crisis, social media firms need to co-operate with public agencies in a way that respects 
users' privacy. However, sharing data about public problems should be more than performative, it should 
be meaningful and constructive. And it should be matched with responsive support and communication 
channels so that researchers can make progress understanding problems that the social media firms 
themselves seem to have difficulty investigating. 
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